This paper takes a discrete−time adaptation of the continuous−time matching economy described in Pissarides (1990 Pissarides ( , 2000, and computes the solution to the dynamic planning problem. The solution is shown to be completely characterized by a first−order, non−linear map. We show that the map admits a unique stationary solution which is dynamically unstable. Oscillatory solutions are possible but there is no possibility of periodic solutions. The planner picks the initial condition that places the economy directly on the steady state. Our results are in sharp contrast to received wisdom on out−of−steady−state dynamics in the continuous−time decentralized version of the Pissarides model where adjustment to the steady state is non−instantaneous, and overshooting of vacancies is possible.
Introduction
This paper takes as a starting point Ljungqvist and Sargent's (2000; Chapter 19) discrete-time adaptation of the continuous-time matching economy described in Pissarides (1990 Pissarides ( , 2000 and computes the solution to the dynamic planning problem. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the dynamic properties of the planning solution in the standard textbook model of labor market search. The solution is shown to be completely characterized by a first-order, non-linear scalar difference equation. The main contribution of this paper is to show that a) there is a unique stationary solution, b) it is locally unstable, and c) oscillatory solutions are possible but there is no possibility of periodic solutions. The implication is strong and clear: in an economy characterized by search and matching frictions, an omniscient social planner has no option but to "jump" to the stationary solution straightaway. These results also suggest that merely delegating the job of coordinating labor market search activity to a planner immediately renders an economy immune to any kind of indeterminacies or endogenous fluctuations. 1 Several papers in the literature have investigated the possibility of non-stationary solutions in search models of the labor market. The seminal papers in this area are Drazen (1988) and Diamond and Fudenberg (1989) ; both build on Diamond (1982) and prove the existence of stable limit cycles in a model where there are frictions in coordinating trade, and the matching technology is subject to increasing returns. More recently, Mortensen (1999) revisits the standard textbook model of search and matching in the labor market as described in Pissarides (1990) but introduces an increasing returns to scale production technology to generate multiple long-run unemployment equilibria and stable limit cycles. 2 Shimer and Smith (2001) explore optimal matching policies in constant returns to scale search economies with heterogenous agents and find the possibility of non-stationarity.
The current endeavour is different from the previous literature in three important ways. First, the focus here (as in Shimer and Smith, 2001 ) is on the planning solution as opposed to the "decentralized" solution (the focus of the other aforementioned papers). In particular, there is no free entry condition for firm entry to contend with, nor is there a wage-rent sharing equation derived from protocols of Nash bargaining. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the dynamic properties of the planning solution in the standard Pissarides (2000) model. Recall that the dynamics of the decentralized solution (as explored for the continuous-time case in Chapter 1.7 of Pissarides, 2000) is characterized by a system of two differential equations, and that the unique steady state is a saddle point. There, the perfect foresight path in the neighborhood of the equilibrium is unique: a unique set of initial conditions place the economy on the saddle path and non-instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium takes place from there. In fact, overshooting of vacancies is even possible. In contrast, we find that the dynamics of the planning solution is characterized by a scalar non-linear difference equation and the unique steady state is locally unstable. The planner chooses the initial condition to place the economy directly on the steady state; adjustment is instantaneous and no overshooting is possible. Thus there is one and only one planning solution. This last result is of great importance since the famed Hosios condition, a comparison of the social optimum to the market outcome, always done at the steady state which we have now shown is the only possible equilibrium.
The second departure from the previous literature is that neither the production nor the matching technologies in our model exhibit any increasing returns. Finally, unlike the continuous-time framework used by Mortensen (1999) and Shimer and Smith (2001) , we use the discrete-time adaptation. 3 This is important when contrasted again with the decentralized solution to the continuous-time matching economy. There firms create or destroy vacancies instantaneously so as to ensure that the value of a new vacancy is always zero. In our setup, however, vacancies created this period with a cost affect employment next period and this introduces a time delay that is not present in the continuous time environment.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the Pissarides (2000) model of search and matching in labor markets. Section 3 contains a detailed analysis of the main difference equation alluded to earlier. Proofs of some central results are to be found in the appendices.
The Model
The model (and the notation) is based entirely on Ljungqvist and Sargent's (2000) discrete-time adaptation of the continuous-time matching economy described in Pissarides (1990 Pissarides ( , 2000 . Let t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... index time. There are two types of agents: workers and firms. There is a continuum of identical workers of measure 1. These workers are all infinitely-lived, they discount the future at the rate β, and are risk-neutral. Workers potentially get matched with a firm; the result of such a match is output y. 4 Each firm may employ at most one worker. A firm incurs a vacancy cost of c in each period when looking for a worker. A match between a worker and a firm gets dissolved with an exogenously-specified probability s. An unmatched worker is an unemployed worker; such a worker enjoys the current utility from leisure of amount z.
Matches are brought together by a standard matching technology connecting only unemployed job seekers with open vacancies. The number of successful matches in a period is given by M(u t , v t ) where u t is the total measure of unemployed workers looking for jobs, and v t is the number of vacancies or firms looking for employees. The matching function is increasing in both arguments, concave, and homogenous of degree one. For all that we present below, we will assume a standard constant returns to scale formulation,
where A is a scale parameter. The parameter α is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the measure of unemployed workers. Let θ t ≡ v t /u t indicate the measure of labor market tightness, or the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers. Then define q (θ t ) ≡ M(u t , v t )/v t denote the probability with which a vacancy gets filled at date t. It follows that q (θ) = Aθ −α < 1 must hold. Similarly, the probability that an unemployed worker gets matched at date t is given by θq (θ) = Aθ 1−α < 1. Finally, define n t+1 as the total number of employed workers at the start of t + 1. Then, it follows that
The number of people with jobs at the beginning of t + 1 include the number of undissolved matches which were formed at the start of t that survived onto the start of t + 1 [given by (1 − s)n t ] in addition to the new matches formed at t. The following lemma [for proof see Appendix A] will be useful below.
Lemma 1 Unless A < 1 obtains, either q (θ) > 1 or θq (θ) > 1 for all θ will be true.
Lemma 1 demonstrates that for the employment probability to be well-defined, A must lie between 0 and 1. This restriction on the scale parameter A is an artifact of the discrete-time nature of the model economy.
A planner's problem could then be outlined as follows. Assume that the planner chooses an allocation that maximizes the discounted value of output and leisure net of vacancy costs. The principal tensions are as follows. An extra vacancy adds a cost, makes it easier for unemployed workers to find jobs, but makes it harder for firms to find workers. Employed workers "lose" leisure utility. More output is produced if the extra vacancy creates more matches. The planner takes all this into account when choosing the number of vacancies. Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000; p. 578), the planner chooses v t and next period's employment level, n t+1 by solving (P) where (P) is defined by
subject to (2), given a n 0 . The Lagrangian can be written as
where λ t is the Lagrange multiplier on (2) . Then, the first-order conditions with respect to v t and n t+1 for an interior solution are given by
and
In Appendix B, we show that the second order conditions hold. In addition, we verify that (3) and (4) reduce to the following first-order difference equation in θ :
where a ≡ β (1 − s) ∈ (0, 1)
b ≡ Aαβ ∈ (0, 1)
using Lemma 1, and
Equation (5) is the law of motion for the index of labor market tightness in the economy under the planner's solution. Such a sequence for θ must additionally satisfy q(θ) ∈ (0, 1) , and n < 1. As is clear from (5), it is clearly convenient to study the backward dynamics as it is derived explicitly from the first order conditions more easily than the more standard forward dynamics; in fact, θ t is easily described as a function of θ t+1 while the relationship of θ t+1 to θ t is typically a correspondence. 5 Before proceeding further, it is instructive to contrast the "final product" i.e., eq. (5) with something similar that can be obtained in the decentralized continuous-time matching economy of Pissarides (2000).
As described in Chapter 1 of Pissarides (2000) , such an economy may be ultimately reduced to a system of two differential equations in the (u, θ) space. There is a unique stationary solution and it is a saddle point. Under perfect foresight, the initial conditions on unemployment and tightness must place the economy on the saddle path from where noninstantaneous adjustment to the steady state follows. As we show below, eq. (5) in contrast is a one-variable difference equation, with a unique stationary solution; the planner must pick a initial condition to place the economy instantaneously on this steady state.
Stationary and non-stationary solutions
Given values of n 0 and θ 0 (or v 0 ), eq. (5) completely characterizes the unique trajectory of θ and all other endogenous variables. 6 In other words, the backwards dynamics of this model can be characterized by the continuous four-parameter family of maps g :
and θ max = ¡ αa b ¢ 1 1−α and g max is implicitly defined as the lowest positive root of the following equation:
ag α max − bg max + d = 0. The first derivative of the map can be calculated as
which implies that g is unimodal with a unique maximum at
Lemma 2
The map g(θ) has a unique stationary solution (θ ss ) implicitly defined by aθ α ss − bθ ss = θ α ss − d.
Note that it is not possible to obtain a closed form expression for θ ss . Below, we prove that θ ss is locally unstable.
Proposition 1 θ ss is asymptotically stable in the non-standard backward dynamics implying it is unstable in the usual forward dynamics.
The implication is clear and powerful. The only stationary solution to the planner's problem is dynamically unstable. The planner must pick the initial conditions in such a way as to place the economy directly and immediately on the steady state. Hence, there is only one solution to the planner's problem and it is the stationary solution.
Finally, we prove that the planning solution may exhibit oscillatory behavior but never any cycles.
It follows from Proposition 2 that since g 0 (θ ss ) < 0 is possible, the planning solution may exhibit oscillatory behavior; however, since the oscillations are damped in the backward dynamics, they are necessarily undamped in the usual forward dynamics. Furthermore, since g 0 (θ ss ) can never equal −1 or go below −1, possibility of two or higher period cycles are ruled out. 6 Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000; p. 578) assume that the planner just knows n0. However, only if θ0 is additionally known can we compute the entire unique solution sequence {θt} ∞ t=1 . From there, using (2), it is then possible to compute the optimal sequences {v t } ∞ t=0 , {u t } ∞ t=1 , and {n t } ∞ t=1 . To compute the steady state θ ss , however, information on θ 0 is not needed.
Concluding remarks
This paper studies the planning solution to the standard Pissarides (1990 Pissarides ( , 2000 "textbook model" of search and matching in labor markets. We show that the planning solution is completely characterized by a first-order, non-linear scalar difference equation. There is a unique stationary solution. In fact, it is the only possible solution. The steady state is dynamically unapproachable from a arbitrary set of initial conditions. The planner sets the initial condition to place the economy directly on the steady state. Additionally, the planning solution may exhibit oscillatory behavior but never any cycles. These results are contrasted with those obtained for the decentralized version of the Pissarides (2000) model.
Appendix

A Proof of Lemma 1
Re-writing the conditions that q (θ) < 1 and θq (θ) < 1, we get
For this interval to be non-empty, we require
If A is greater than one, it must therefore be the case that either q (θ) or θq (θ) is greater than 1.¥
B Second Order Conditions for (P)
It is easy to verify that the second derivatives of the Lagrangian are
Therefore the sufficient conditions for a local maximum to obtain are that ∂ 2 $
we can write
Clearly both of these are negative since 0 < α < 1.
C Derivation of Equation (5)
From (3), we obtain the following expression for λ t :
Using (A1) for period t and period t + 1, we can insert this expression into (4):
Inserting the expressions for q (θ) and q 0 (θ) (recall that q (θ) = Aθ −α ) and re-arranging, we get:
From here, straightforward manipulation yields
which immediately provides the desired expression in (5) .¥
D Proof of Lemma 2
Re-writing the equation which defines the steady state, we get:
First note that the function on the left hand side of (A3) takes the value d > 0 when θ = 0, while the right hand side of (A3) starts out at 0. Further more the left hand side is strictly decreasing, as a < 1, and the right-hand side is strictly increasing as b > 0. This implies that if a steady state exists, it will be unique. Furthermore, since a < 1 lim there exists aθ such that (a − 1)θ α + d < bθ.
Since both the left hand side and the right hand side are continuous, a standard fixed point argument will establish that a steady state exists. We have thus established that the map g (θ) has a unique stationary solution.¥ E Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
Note that if g 0 (θ ss ) ∈ (−1, 1) , the map is stable in the backwards dynamics, and therefore it is unstable in the forward dynamics. Therefore the proof of both propositions will be complete if we can show that g 0 (θ ss ) ∈ (−1, 1) . Using the definition of θ ss , namely that θ ss = (aθ α ss − bθ ss + d) 1 α , as well as the definition of the parameters, we get the following expression for g 0 (θ ss ) : g 0 (θ ss ) = (aθ α ss − bθ ss + d)
Now, since 0 < β < 1, 0 < s < 1, and 0 < q (θ) < 1, it is immediately clear that g 0 (θ ss ) ∈ (−1, 1) .¥
